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states that an incorrigible girl may be returned to the committing
court; or at the discretion of the Commissioner of Public Institutions, she may be transferred to another institution or otherwise
disposed of. This statute is also much broader than the comparative Maine statute because of the discretionary power which the
commissioner has.2 7 The Maine statute gives the commissioner a
choice of either transferring or not transferring. The West Virginia
statute gives the commissioner the choice of (1) sending the girl
back to court, (2) transferring the girl, or (3) otherwise disposing
of the girl. This statutory provision and West Virginia Code chapter
25, article 1, section 16, both separately and combined, give the
Commissioner of Public Institutions the power to effect transfers on
an ex parte basis. By leaving the ultimate determination to the
Commissioner's discretion, the provision permits action which,
in light of Shone, presumably is violative of the Federal Constitution. It is questionable whether the West Virginia court would read
the requirement of a judicial hearing into the present West Virginia
statutests because, as in the Maine statute, there is no suggestion
that a court's approval is necessary to the transfer.
Delby Barker Stobbs

Constitutional Law - Lance v. Board of Education Constitutionality of Extraordinary Majority Elections
The plaintiffs were taxpayers, citizens, and registered voters
residing in Roane County, West Virginia, who had participated in
a special election submitted by the Board of Education to the
county voters for approval of a bond issue and an additional fiveyear tax levy." The vote canvass indicated that the bond issue was
See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. Supra note 3.

'Recently there have been some attempts by the West Virginia Legislature
to modernize concepts in chapters 25, 26 and 28 of the West Virginia Code. Of
particular relevance was S.B. 292 which died in the House, May 19, 1969. S.B.
292, W. Va. Leg. Reg. Sess. 1969. The bill involved repealing chapters 25 and
28 of the West Virginia Code, abolishing the Department of Public Institutions
and the commissioner, and creating a Department of Correction with a new
commissioner. Unfortunately, the new provisions would have given the new
commissioner the same transfer powers as the present Commissioner of Public
Institutions now has.
'The bond revenue was to provide for improvement of existing facilities in
the way of classroom construction, and for the removal of fire hazards. The levy
revenue was allocated partially to current expenditures as well as to improvements. Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E. 2d 788, 785 (W. Va. 1969).
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favored by 51.551% of the total votes cast and the levy by
51.51% of the total votes cast, both short of the required sixty percent approval.2 Both issues having received a majority, the plaintiffs
appeared before the Board of Education, alleged that the constitutional and statutory extraordinary majority mandates violated their
constitutional rights, and demanded that the bonds be issued and
the tax be levied. Following refusal of the Board to act, plaintiffs
brought two declaratory judgment actions in the circuit court of
Roane County requesting the court to declare the sixty percent
requirements unconstitutional and void as a violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and of the guaranty
clause of article four of the United States Constitution. 3 After consolidation of the actions, the trial court sustained the defendant's
motions for judgment on the pleadings and directed the dismissal

'The state constitution and code with reference to bonds provide:
... no debt shall be contracted under this section, unless all questions
connected with the same, shall have been first submitted to a vote of
the people, and have received three-fifths of all the votes cast for
and against the same.
W. VA. CONSr. art. X, § 8.
No debt shall be contracted or bonds issued under this article until all
questions connected with the same shall have been first submitted to a
vote of the qualified electors of the political division for which the
bonds are to be issued, and shall have received three-fifths of all the
votes cast for and against the same ....
W. VA. CODE ch. 13, art. 1, § 4 (Michie 1966).
If three-fifths of all the votes cast for and against the proposition to
incur debt and issue negotiable bonds shall be in favor of the same,
the governing body of the political division shall, by resolution, authorize the issuance of such bonds ....
W. VA. CoDE ch. 13, art. 1, § 14 (Michie 1966).
The state constitution and code with reference to excess levy elections provide:
[N]o increase shall be effective unless at least sixty percent of the
qualified voters shall favor such increase,...
W. VA. CONsr. art. X, § 1.
If at least sixty percent of the voters cast their ballots in favor of the
additional levy, the local levying body may impose the additional
levy ....
W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 8, § 16 (Michie 1966).
Although the excess levy provisions appear to require a percentage approval of
the total number of voters, judicial interpretation has indicated that the
provisions relate only to the number of votes actually cast.
Warden v. County Court, 116 W. Va. 695, 183 S.E. 39 (1935).
'In one action, plaintiffs requested the court to order the board of education to authorize and promote the issuance of the bonds on grounds that the
three-fifths requirements were unconstitutional. See W. VA. CONsT. art. X § 8;
W. VA. CODE, ch. 13, art. 1, §§ 4, 14 (Michie 1966). In the other action, the
plaintiffs requested the court to order the board to impose the levy, challenging
the validity of the sixty percent vote requirements. See W. VA. CONsT. art.
X, § 1; W. VA. CODE ch. 11, art. 8, § 16 (Michie 1966).
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of the complaint thus upholding the validity of the constitutional
and statutory provisions.
Plaintiffs appealed, and the court granted leave to move to
reverse the trial court's judgment. Held, reversed and remanded.
The plaintiffs' votes were debased and diluted thereby depriving
them of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The challenged constitutional and statutory provisions violate the fourteenth amendment's protections as embodied
in the "one person, one vote" concept and, as such, are void. Lance
v. Board of Education, 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969) .4
I. The Majority Argument
A. Jurisdiction
The majority initiated its argument by noting jurisdiction pursuant to the supremacy clause, which establishes the court's authority to invalidate a state constitutional provision inconsistent with
the Federal Constitution. The declaratory judgment action was
then recognized as the proper proceeding for the controversy.0 Following the determination of the propriety of the proceeding, the
'Following the court's determination and prior to the remand to the circuit court, a motion for leave to intervene as additional parties defendant and
for rehearing was filed with the supreme court by counsel for a number of
Roane County citizens. In asserting their right of intervention, the movants
contended that the initial proceeding was a friendly action in that both
parties sought the same interest, and submitted that the original opinion was
erroneous in that the "one person, one vote" concept did not support the
conclusions. They alleged that there was no discriminatory factor involved in
the state provisions (at issue) which would adversely affect one's equal
protection under the law, pointing out that the provisions only qualify the
power of a political subdivision to levy taxes and to incur indebtedness. Moreover, they contended that the action of the supreme court invalidated the provisions in their entirety since the three-fifths vote requirements are inseverable.
Motion and Brief for Leave to Intervene as Additional Parties Defendant and
for Rehearing. Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969). (Filed
Aug. 6, 1969).
The supreme court granted on November 11, 1969, the intervention of
additional parties defendant but denied the rehearing petition by the same
4-1 margin as in the original decision. Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E. 2d 783,
804 (W. Va. 1969).
4-1 margin as in the original decision. Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E. 2d 783,
'The court cited as authority the supremacy clauses of the United States
and West Virginia Constitutions and three United States Supreme Court cases
declaring state constitutional provisions to be violative of the fourteenth
amendment This issue is discussed more fully with reference to Judge Haymond's
disent, in a subsequent comment in this issue.
'The decision cited as conclusive West Virginia authority, Nuckois v.
Athey, 149 W. Va. 40, 138 S.E. 2d 344 (1964). Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E.
2d 783, 787 (W. Va. 1969).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1970

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 18

19701

CASE COMMENTS

court considered the relevance of a West Virginia constitutional provision demanding "equal representation in government." 7 The majority found a similarity of purpose between this provision and the
federal equal protection clause. Though the appellants argued that
the provision illustrates that the principle of majority rule is firmly.
embedded in our state government,8 the significance of the majority's finding of a similarity is arguable. Specifically, what does the
state constitutional provision connote beyond the mere requirement of equality in all apportionments for representation? 9 In addition, a question arises as to whether one clause in a state constitution should even be considered in countering the validity of another clause in the same document.
B. Justiciability
The next significant question considered by the court was that
of justiciability. The court found that the plaintiffs' assertion that
the dilution of their votes denied them their fourteenth amendment rights presented a justiciable question cognizable by the
courts.-x The majority did not examine the question in depth but
apparently relied on the obvious similarities between Baker v.
Carr" and Lance. It is arguable that the issue of justiciability should
not have been dismissed so lightly, in that a legislative reapportionment controversy and an extraordinary majority requirement for
"Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E. 2d 785, 786 (W. Va. 1969).
'Brief on Behalf of Appellants at 30, Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E. 2d
783 (W. Va. 1969).
'Cf. State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 150 W. Va. 71, 143 SXE.2d 791 (1965). This
decision concerned the apportionment for representation in a proposed constitutional convention, but is not very helpful to a discussion of the extent of
the application of the constitutional provision.
"Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E.2d 783 (W. Va. 1969).
"369 U.S. 186 (1962). Judicial inquiry into the "political thicket" of voting
processes has been well established by the apportionment cases. For many years
the Supreme Court considered all political questions to involve non-justiciable
controversies since the justiciable power of the United States extends only to
"case and controversies" U. S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2. See e.g., Commercial Trust Co.
v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923); Luther v. Borden, 7 U.S. (Harv.) 1 (1849). But
after Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), all questions with respect to political
rights as against state political action were no longer necessarily political questions. In distinguishing a political question from a discrimination that
"reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action," Id. at 226, the
court asserted that the equal protection clause provides adequate grounds for
the court to decide whether the discrimination reflected reasonable state
policy or was simply arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 209. Is the policy set forth
by the West Virginia constitutional provisions in controversy arbitrary and
capricious to the same extent as the failure to reapportion the Tennessee legislature was in Baker v. Carr? Arguably it is not. But the issue does not appear to
come within any of Mr. Justice Brennan's criteria for determining what consti-
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referendums might be distinguished. The discrimination in both
situations relates to political rights,' 2 yet it must be kept in mind
that the justiciability of an issue remains a separation of powers
problem. 3 A consideration of the repective roles of political and
judicial bodies is not irrelevant. It might be significant to recognize
that other vote weighting controversies, notably the reapportionment cases, concerned a political question which was (1) not amenable to probable political solution, and for which (2) a realistic,
though novel, judicial solution was available. For example, in the
Tennessee reapportionment controversy, the legislature had not
reapportioned itself since 1906 and there was little prospect of such
action; and the judicial solution was effective. But in the controversy under consideration the realistic judicial solution is obvious,
14
but how remote was the likelihood of a political solution? Specifically, amending the West Virginia constitution and securing the
reapportionment of a state legislative body not obliged to act present tasks of different magnitude to the voters. Although these distinctions between the reapportionment cases and the West Virginia
controversy are apparent upon close examination, it appears that
the controversy is cognizable by the courts. The appellants here,
just as the plaintiffs in Baker v. Carr,'G contended they were "denied
the equal protection of the laws.., by virtue of the debasement of
their votes,"' and the court determined that "[t] he right asserted
is within the reach of judicial protection .... "11
tutes a political question: "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non
judical discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id. at 217. Yet uncertainty exists in the doctrine of justiciability because it "has become a blend of constitutional requirements and policy considerations." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
97 (1968).
'Equal protection is not diminished because the discrimination relates to
political rights. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944).
'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
"In 1966 the majority of the voters voted down a proposed amendment to
the state constitution which would have reduced the voter approval requirements
for bond issues and excess levies to a simply majority. 51 Wzsr VIRGINIA BLuE
BooK 474 (1967).
"369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"Id. at 194.
"Id. at 237.
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C. Controversy
The genuineness of the controversy is the next concern of the
court. In light of the court's treatment, it is difficult to determine
whether they were discussing "controversy" in a constitutional sense
or merely in a general sense. The majority found a genuine controversy by relating the contextual circumstances behind the plaintiffs'
complaints, specifically, the physical conditions of the schools and
the fact of the failure with a majority vote of the six preceding
referendumis1 But the movants to intervene, arguing the constitutional aspects, asserted that no genuine controversy existed because
the parties were seeking the same objective.19 They contended that
this was merely a friendly suit containing no true element of adverseness, evidenced by the fact that defendants instructed their counsel
to proceed no further.20 It can be argued that there was no "collision of actively asserted. - . claims" based upon a" 'real, earnest and
vital controversy between individuals.' "21 Both the appellants and
the appellees were interested in the application of the bond issue
and tax levy funds to the betterment of the physical conditions of
the schools. But the controversy under consideration seems to meet
the West Virginia requirement that the "evidence . . . present a
claim of legal right asserted by one party and denied by the other
before jurisdiction of a suit may be taken." ' There appears to
have been adequate adverseness for an adjudication, in that it was
the refusal of the Board of Education to act upon the plaintiffs'
demands that constituted the grounds for the action, not the simi23
larity of interests.
After recognizing the existence of a genuine controversy, the
court proceeded to establish a denial of appellants' right to equal

"Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E,2d 78a, 787-88 (W. Va. 1969).
"'This consideration might also be relevant to the issue of justiciability:
Does the fact that the parties in the Roane County controversy both sought the
same object further demonstrate the political nature of the controversy?
2Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene as Additional Parties
Defendant and for Rehearing, Lance v. Board of Edutc., 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va.
1969) (filed Aug. 6, 1969).
mPoe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961).
nMainella v. Trustees, 126 W. V. 183, 186, 27 S.E-2d 486, 488, (1943). See
akso, City of South Charleston v. Board of Educ., 132 W. Va. 77, 50 S.E2d 880

(1948).
'in a suit for declaratory relief, an actual controversy exists when a public
official, pursuant to an official duty, denies a right asserted by another party,
and the official's personal wishes are not at issue. Mainella v. Board of
Trustees, 126 W. Va. 183, 185-86, 27 S.E.2d 486, 487-88 (194a).
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protection of the laws. The court based its conclusions on (1) the
four major reapportionment cases which established the "one man,
one vote" principle,24 (2) three recent cases which concerned voter
exclusion on discriminatory grounds, 5 and (3) a state court decision
which invalidated an extraordinary majority requirement for amending a state constitutionmY6 The court emphasized in each of
these decisions either the factor of weight accorded an individual's
vote or the type of election with which the case was concerned.2
II. Grounds for Distinction
The challenge to the validity of the sixty percent vote requirements might be distinguished from the cases relied upon by the
majority decision in Lance on a number of grounds.
A. Type of Election
Initially, the type of election may furnish grounds for distinction.28 It can be argued that the "one person, one vote" concept
contemplates a narrow construction, 29 in that it only demands that
that qualified voters be reflected equally in legislative bodies3 0
Supreme Court interpretation has currently extended the concept
only to legislative representation elections. Under this view the

'Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 US. 621 (1969); Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 US. 701 (1969),; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966).
"State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 78 N.M. 682, 437 P. 2d 143 (1968).
'Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E. 2d 783, 788-90 (W.Va. 1969).
'The Appellees and Movants to Intervene asserted that the only matter
debased was the power of a political subdivision to lay taxes or incur indebtedness, this being the issue of the controversy. Appellees Note of Argument at 2,
and Motion for Leave to Intervene as Additional Parties Defendant and for Rehearing at 4, Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E. 2d (W.Va. 1969). This contention
was adeptly observed by the court to amount to argument by circumlocution. The
action was addressed to the rights of the plaintiffs, and only upon the basis
of a prior determination concerning these rights could the extent of the authority of the political subdivision be determined. Lance v. Board of Educ., supra
at 790.
'This term was originated by Mr. Justice Douglas in Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, (1963). "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments can only mean one thing - one person, one vote." Id.
at 381.
'Equal reflection of the individual in the law-making assembly means, for
example, that one man may not be reflected as one two-thousandth and
another as one ten-thousandth of a legislative vote simply because of variation
in district apportionment.
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principle would require equal reflection in the legislative body but
not equal reflection in the making of laws.-' By the same token it can
be further argued that the legislative body is free to make whatever rules it pleases as to the percentage of legislative votes required
to enact legislation. Thus, the "one person, one vote" concept
would guarantee the right to an equal reflection in the legislative
assembly but not the right to an equal reflection in the law-making
process. This would apparently be true whether the legislating is
32
by a representative body or by a direct referendum of the people.
The application of the "one person, one vote" concept under this
interpretation would then hinge on whether the voter is legislating
or whether he is choosing a representative. It obviously applies to
representation elections, yet its application to the direct legislative
responsibilities of the people is not so clear.
It may be asserted that the majority's treatment of Lance is an
unwarranted extension of the "one person, one vote" principle into
the area of the direct legislative responsibilities of the people. But
in making this assertion one would have to explain away State ex rel.
Witt v. State Canvassing Board,33 which applied the principle to
amending a state constitution. Clearly, the process of amending a
state constitution is a direct law-making function of the people.
In addition, this attempt to distinguish Lance from the "one
person, one vote" line of decisions on grounds of the type of election
overlooks what appears to be the implied premise of the "one person, one vote" concept: "Equal protection of the law demands majority rule in voting."34 Without the principle of majority rule as
-This was argued by the defendants in a recent California decision which
declared a two-thirds approval requirement for certain types of bond issues unconstitutional. Brief for Respondents, Larez v. Shannon, Mem. Decision, Sutter
County Superior Court, No. 16043 (Aug. 8, 1969).
'It is recognized that the legislative function often rests in the people. See
note 83 infra.

378 N.M. 682, 437 P. 2d 143 (1969).
'This was the basic premise of the apportionment cases and has been extended through all recent vote dilution cases. See note 35, infra, for an explanation. The rationale in the majority of the apportionment cases has concentrated
on the percentage of the population required to elect a majority of the legislators, and if there has been a substantial deviation, the court has found a
denial of equal protection. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 528-30 (1969) ;
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 442-45 (1967); Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly,
377 U.S. 713, 723-29 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 703-08 (1964); Davis
v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 687-89 (1964); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656,
664-70 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 642-52 (1964); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 544-50 (1964). See also Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474, 476 (1968); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2 (1964).
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an implied premise, there can be no concept of vote dilution or
vote weighting."1 And- this premise is not novel to the ideological
underpinning of our constitutional democracy. The doctrine of natural equality, which together with the concept of liberty forms the
philosophical foundation for the basic documents of our government,36 requires that no man assert superiority over another.3 7 This
assumed innate equality of man provided the theoretical foundation
for majority rule.38 The notion that the concept of majority rule is
fundamental to our idea of equality as embodied in the Constitution
has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court on a number of
occasions.3 9 Moreover, this underlying premise of majority rule by
its very nature admits of no differentiation as to what one is voting
for.-

"The concept of vote weighting had to be synthesized from majority rule,
in that, the concept admits of no other derivation. For example, in X and Y
districts each containing 1000 people, one's vote has the same effect as the votes
of three persons in Z district containing 3000 people. Each person is equal in that
he has one vote for one legislator. Why, then, is there a denial of equal protection? Such a denial is found only because a minority can thwart the majority
in the legislative forum. The will of 2000 persons in W and Y districts can
defeat that of the 3000 residents of Z district. Thus, the whole idea of vote
weighting or dilution of one's vote is dependent upon the doctrine of majority
rule for its existence. The appellants in Lance recognized the significance of
this frustration of the will of the majority. Brief on behalf of Appellants at 31,
Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969).

'See

SENTATION

R. McCAY,
9-34

R APPORTIONMENT;

(1965).

THE LAW

AND POLIcs OF EqUAL REPRE-

'John Locke, perhaps the strongest philosophical influence in regard to the
formation of our representative democracy, spoke of a "state . . . of equality
wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than
another." J. LocKE, SECOND TREATiSE OF CIvIL GOVERNMENT 118 (Everyman's
Library ed. 1924).
mSee generally, id. at 90-100. "[Elvery man, by consenting with others to
make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation to everyone of that society to submit to the determination of the majority.
.." Id. at 97.

'E.g., "[T]he democratic ideals of equality and majority rule, which have
served this Nation so well in the past, are hardly of any less significance for the
present and the future." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). "Equal
Protection... demands that the plan must be such as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate of the State ....
[A]ny
plan which could be shown systematically to prevent ultimate effective majority
rule, would be invalid under accepted Equal Protection Clause standards."
Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
"See State ex rel. Witt v State Canvassing Bd. 78 N.M. 682, 437 P. 2d 143
(1968). Without the basic premise of majority rule the court could have
found no disparity of values given to different votes.
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B. Different Type of Discriminatory Classification
Secondly, it may be that the cases relied upon by the majority
to establish a denial of equal protection do not furnish a direct
precedent for the Lance decision because it involved a different type
of discriminatory classification. The equal protection guarantee
safeguards individual rights against all varieties of invidious dis42
crimination42 whether the state classification is in the form of race,
4
6
5
citizenship,47
economic status,
sex, 4 3 condition,4 employment,
economic regulation/6 or place of residence.49 It can be argued that
the clause's interpretation as embodied in the "one person, one
vote" principle protects an individual only against a single form of
discriminatory state action-that due to place of residence. ' ° This
concept, as it has been judicially applied to date, would not, then,
invalidate all discriminatory weighting of votes but only that unreasonable discrimination based on place of residence.,-

"Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 484 (1968); Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957). However, it makes little difference whether the discrimination
is called "invidious," e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 253 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting), "arbitrary and capricious," Id. at 192, or "without any possible justification in reality," Id. at 265 (Stewart J., dissenting). E.g. Gomtllion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
'Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461

(1953).
'E.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, (1948) (dissenting opinion); White v.
Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408-409 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
4"E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 525 (1942).
'E.g., Sware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Meredith v.
Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm'n 397 F. 2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968).
"E.g., Douglas v. Coffman, 372 U.S. 353 (1962); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956).
"E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
'E.g., Truaz v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock

Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
"E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533

(1964).
'For example, if W lives in one district of two thousand people and W lives
in a district of ten thousand people, X has five times the weight in choosing a
representative as does Y because he lives in the specific district.
"The appellants asserted in Lance, "The only question presented to the
court in this case is whether the 'one man, one vote' principle as applied to an
election of competing candidates . . . is applicable to a referendum type of
election." Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Authorities in Opposition to Motion
to Intervene and Rehearing at 14, Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va.
1969). They attempted to show that since the factor of weighting of votes is
similar in both representation and referendum elections, the ',one person, one
vote" concept is applicable to referendums; and that since there is no legitimate state interest to justify this vote weighting, majority rule is the only
constitutional method to conduct referendum elections. Brief on Behalf of Appellants at 19-31, Lance v. Board of Educ supra. But the application of the "one
person, one vote" principle was extended to referendums in the New
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With the exception of two cases, the authority relied upon by
the majority decision in Lance illustrates only this single form of
discrimination. Baker v. Carr52 and Reynolds v. Sims 5s both concerned the geographical dilution of the individual's vote due to malapportionment in the state legislature. Gray v. Sanders;r4 concerning Georgia's county unit system for determining the outcome of
primary elections for state-wide offices, considered the weight of a
citizen's vote within a single constituency but only on grounds that
votes of individuals residing in certain counties were debased in
relation to those living in others.5 5 The court in Wesberry v. Sanders,561 applied this concept to Congressional districting without
explicitly relying on the equal protection clause, indicating that "a
vote worth more in one district than in another... run [s] counter to
our fundamental ideas of democratic government. 5' 7 In State ex rel.

Mexico decision. The appellants failed to recognize that the "one person, one
vote" concept to date has only been applied to discriminatory classifications based
on place of residence. A more direct assertion of the issue of the case might be
stated: "Is the discriminatory classification on grounds of one's convictions justified by a compelling state interest within the meaning of the equal protection
clause?" See text at section III infra.
"369 U.S. 168 (1962).
-377 U.S. 533 (1964). "The fact that an individual lives here or there is
not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his vote...
[T]he weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives."
Id. at 567.
"372 U.S. 368 (1963). "How . . . can one person be given twice or ten
times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because
he lives... in the smaller rural county? Once the geographical unit for which
a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in the
election are to have an equal vote." Id. at 379-80.
"'"Gray ... established the basic principle of equality among voters within
a state, and held that voters cannot be classified, constitutionally, on the basis
of where they live .... " Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 53a, 560 (1964). The appellants contended that the "sixty percent requirements . . . present the exact
question which was decided in Gray v. Sanders." Brief on Behalf of Appellants
at 23, Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969). Rather, it should be
pointed out that Gray involved basicially the same elements as the reapportionment cases - a representation election and a discriminatory classification based
upon place of residence.
'376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court declared that the words "by the people of
the several states" of article I, section 2 of the Constitution meant that "as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as
much as another's." Id. at 8. The court based this argument on grounds that this
concept had been applied initially in our country's history when representatives
were elected in state-wide elections, and the debates at the Constitutional Convention and the contentions of The Federalist show that the intentions of the
framers centered around having representation in the House based on population.
'lid. at 8.
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Witt v. State CanvassingBoard,5s which involed a state constitutional provision requiring a two-thirds approval in each county and a
three-fourths overall approval to amend the constitution, the New
Mexico Supreme Court relied on the "one person, one vote" principle to declare that the requirement of a two-thirds favorable vote
in each county, a form of geographical discrimination, fell within
the prohibitions of the equal protection clause.59 Although the preceding decisions are not solely apportionment cases, they all involve discriminatory weighting of votes with reference to place of
residence. 0
It is arguable that the remaining two cases relied upon by the
majority illustrate parallel but distinct forms of invidious discrimination. Ciprianov. City of Houma61 involved a state statute giving
only "property taxpayers" the right to vote in municipal bond approval elections. This discriminatory classification based upon nonownership of property was voided by the Court on equal protection
ground. The court noted that "[t] he challenged statute contains
a classification which excludes otherwise qualified voters who are as
substantially affected and directly interested in the matter voted up-

n7 8 N.M. 682, 437 P. 2d 143 (1968). The state constitutional requirement
demanding a three-fourths overall approval to amend the constitution was not
considered since the total state-wide vote for the proposed amendment received
over eighty percent approval, thereby rendering the issue moot. This requirement involves the identical form of discrimination under consideration in the
West0 Virginia provisions.
"Where, as here, a vote in Harding County outweighs a hundred votes in
Bernalillo County, the 'one person, one vote' concept announced in Gray v.
Sanders, supra, certainly is not met." Id. at 688, 437 P. 2d at 149. "[N]o situation
could be projected where the Bernalillo County voter would not be substantially discriminated against merely by virtue of the fact that artifical geographical
lines of counties determine the value of a vote." Id. at 689, 437 P. 2d at 150.
"Other apportionment cases also illustrate that the principle has been
applied only to this single form of discriminatory classification. See e.g.,
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). An apportionment scheme cannot "result in a significant under-valuation of the weight of the votes of certain
of a State's citizens merely because of where they happen to reside." Id. at
653. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474 (1968); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678 (1964) ; Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). The appellees,
defendants below, distinguished the apportionment cases from the West Virginia controversy only on grounds that they involved election of public officials
rather than voting on issues. They "distinguished" the New Mexico case on the
grounds that the two-thirds requirement was so extreme that the case was not
analogous. They did not reach the distinction of the type of discrimination involved. Brief for Appellees at 3, Lance v. Board of Educ. 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va.
1969).
395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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on... ."6 Kramer v. Union Free School District-S concerned a New
York statue that required otherwise eligible voters in certain school
district elections to either own or lease real property, or have children enrolled in the public schools. This decision involved two
discriminatory classifications, one on the basis of property nonownership, the other due to one's family circumstances. Both of
these classifications were held to have no rational basis in promoting the articulated state interest,64 thereby constituting a denial
of equal protection of the laws.
It may be contended that the type of discriminatory classifications relied upon by the majority in Lance (i.e. those based on place
of residence and on non-ownership of property) are distinguishable
from the type of discrimination involved in the three-fifths vote
requirements (i.e. that based upon one's convictions). Requiring an
electorate within one political subdivision to favor an issue by an
extraordinary majority involves the discriminatory weighting of an
individual's vote in accord with one's belief on an issue. Thus, it
may be argued that the majority relied on residence and nonownership of property classifications to invalidate a personal conviction
classification.-5

MId. at 706.

5395 U.S. 621 (1969).
"The appellees asserted that "the State has a legitimate interest in limiting
the franchise in school district elections to 'members of the community of
interest."' Id. at 630-31. The Court enumerated many other resident citizens
who were "primarily interested" and yet were denied the franchise.
"It should be noted that the Movants to Intervene erroneously relied on
Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966), to illustrate the inapplicability of the
"one man, one vote" concept. Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene
and for Rehearing at 7, Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969).
This controversy established the constitutionality of a Georgia constitutional provision permitting a majority of the Georgia General Assembly to elect the
Governor from the two persons having the greatest number of votes cast. Mr.
Justice Black distinguished a situation in which voters had the right to participate in an election from a case in which there was actually no such right involved. He pointed out that Gray v. Sanders "had to do with the equal right of
'all who participate in the election' . .. to vote and have their votes counted
without impairment or dilution." Fortson v. Morris, 385, U.S. 231, 233 (1966).
The Georgia constitutional clause, providing for the choice of a governor by
the legislature when the vote fails to produce a majority, is ditinguishable from
the West Virginia situation in that no right to vote exists after the popular
election produces only a plurality winner. See id. at 233-85. Appellees in Lance,
defendants below, failed to note this distinction. Brief for Appellees at 3, Lance v.
Board of Educ., 170 S.E. 2d 783 (W. Va. 1969). See also Sailors v. Board of Educ.,
887 U.S. 105 (1967).
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The significance of any distinction as to type of discrimination is, however, questionable. When a controversy involves the
denial of a basic right as opposed to mere unfavorable treatment
by legislative action, the courts generally have not delved in depth
into the semantics of classification and reasonableness. 8 Simply
stated, any impairment of voting rights should constitute a denial of
equal protection absent a showing of compelling state interest or
other strong justification by the state.8 7 In addition, distinguishing
Lance from the other vote weighting controversies on the ground
that a different type of discrimination is involved ignores the heavy
burden on the state to justify any discriminatory classification involving the fundamental right of voting.8 Specifically, the personal
conviction classification must be shown not to be unreasonably discriminatory in itself so as not to constitute a denial of equal protection.
C. Extent of Vote Impairment
A third ground for distinction rests upon the extent of the
vote impairment. Two cases previously distinguished on the basis
of the type of discrimination involved 9 might also be distinguished
from Lance on another basis. Specifically, the Cipriano and the
Kramer cases may be differentiated from the West Virginia vote
dilution controversy by the extent of the vote impairment. In these
two cases, the Louisiana and New York statutes provided for the
complete exclusion from the electorate of certain elements of otherwise eligible citizens. That is, there was a complete disenfranchisement, a situation to which the United States Supreme Court might
apply a stricter test of constitutionality. The special test for complete disenfranchisement of elements of the electorate could be:
"[W] hether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling

'See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
US. 535, 541 (1942).
'See e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
'See note 104, infra.
OKramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City

of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). This case concerned school district elections.
See text at notes 61-64 supra.
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state interest." 70 It follows that stronger justification on the part of
the state might be required in total disenfranchisement cases than
would be required for a vote dilution controversy such as Lance.
But, nevertheless, the complete disenfranchisement cases illustrate
the emphasis the Court has placed upon the integrity of the vote,
and, therefore, should not be dismissed merely because of a difference in the degree of the impairment. These decisions illustrate the
heavy burden the Supreme Court has placed upon the state to
justify any impairment of this fundamental right.7 1
III. A Denial of Equal Protection
Although the supreme court of appeals did not make clear its
rationale in declaring the extraordinary majority requirements violative of the equal protection clause, nevertheless, these state statutory and constitutional provisions should fall within the prohibitions of the clause. The equal protection guarantee extends to all
"indiscriminate imposition of inequalities,"7 2 no matter what the
area of discrimination.7 3 "[T]he concept of equal protection has
been . . . viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons
standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned
or challenged." 74 Voting and the various stages of the electoral
process provide only a single application for the fourteenth amendment's protections. This nation's history has witnessed an evolutionary expansion of suffrage rights in accord with democratic ideals.

75

The constitutionally guaranteed rights of those qualified to cast a
7
'Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). In Kramer
and in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 US. 701 (1969), the Court said that
initially it must be determined whether the exclusionary classifications actually

promote the articulated state objective. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., supra

at 632; Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra at 706. Secondly, if the exclusions are
requisite to achieve the asserted state interest, then the court must determine if
the interest constitutes a compelling state interest. Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., supra at 632, n. 14; Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra at 704. In both
these cases the initial issue was sufficient to establish the unconstitutionality of

the provisions. But the application of the compelling state interest test with
reference to disenfranchisement can be seen in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,
96 (1965).
'See note 104, infra.
7
Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948); see also Sweatt v. Painter, 399 U.S.
629, 635 (1950).
"See notes 42-49 supra.
7
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
75
General manhood suffrage was adopted by the 1830's and sooner in
most states. The national mandates include the fifteenth amendment in 1870,
the nineteenth amendment in 1920, and the twenty-fourth amendment in
1964. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § § 1971, 1973 (Supp. IV 1969), and
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vote,7 0 to have their votes counted,7 7 and not to have them impaired by improper procedures7 8 are not questioned. But voting
rights "can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of
a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise."7 9 The right to vote is considered personal, 0 and hence capable of being discriminated against by state
action. And the fact that the constitutional provisions under consideration were approved by a majority of the people s' cannot override the denial of individual constitutional rights.8 '
The essence of a denial of equal protection is an unreasonably
discriminatory classification. But does the requirement of a sixty
percent favorable vote constitute a classification in the equal protection sense?8 3 It can be argued that the extraordinary majority
vote requirements do constitute a "classification" based upon one's
innumerable United States Supreme Court cases are evidence of this evolution.
See e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The invalidation of many reapportionment schemes and techniques of disenfranchisment
demonstrate the expanding protection that the courts are affording voting rights.
aLane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1889).
"United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) ;1United States v. Mosley, 238
U.S. 383 (1915).
"United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371 (1879).
"Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). And as Mr. Justice Douglas
has pointed out, "The concept of 'we the people' under the Constitution visualizes
no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic
qualifications." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
S°United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 227 (1918).
'Article I § 8, was approved in 1872. Annot., W. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 8 (Kelly's
Revised Stat. 1879) and Schedule Adopted in Convention 44 (April 9, 1872).
Article X, § 1, was ratified as an amendment in 1932. Annot., W. VA. CONST. art.
X, § 1.
Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). Also it might be
relevant to consider that in the controversy under consideration, it was a statewide majority that approved the provisions, but the voting was in the county
unit.
'In addition to the argument set out in the text concerning a classification
on the grounds of one's convictions, another type of discriminatory classification might be found in the controversy under consideration - a classification as
to types of legislation which results in a denial of equal protection. See Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). This controversy involved the enforcement
of a fair housing ordinance passed by a city council. Following this enactment, a
number of town citizens petitioned for a referendum and were able to secure a
majority vote on an amendment to the city charter; it required any ordinance
prohibiting discrimination in real estate transactions to be approved by the voters
in a referendum election before such an ordinance would go into effect. This
procedure was prescribed for no other type of legislative enactment. Actually
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convictions, in particular, his convictions concerning the issue submitted to the voters. When a proponent of the issue goes to the
polls he has a substantially greater burden than does the favored
opponent in promoting the successs of his convictions on the issue.
A distinction which increases the legislative burden of one segment
of an electorate seeking the benefit of a law to the advantage of
those opposing it constitutes a discriminatory classification falling
within the prohibitions of the equal protection clause.8 4 In response
one might argue that a prohibited classification must be due to a
distinction inherent in the individual, that is, one that he cannot feasibly alter, such as sex, race or condition. But the reapportionment cases illustrate an invidious classification which was
not inherent and could have been remedied by moving to another
area. Also in response, one may contend that in referendum voting a
person could cast a vote of greater weight by merely abandoning

two areas of classification were alluded to by the court. Initially, the court pointed out how this amendment drew a distinction between two groups of people those seeking the benefit of the ordinance and those opposing it, giving advantage to the latter. Secondly, the court indicated there was a classification as to
types of laws, the referendum being required only for a single type.
This classification as to types of legislation presents an arguable alternative
for finding a "classification" in the West Virginia controversy. It might be contended that the bond issues and tax levies constitute a discriminatory classification of revenue referendums in relation to other types of referendums, which
denies those seeking the benefit of the revenue referendums the equal protection
of the laws. A sample of non-revenue areas for referendum elections indicates
only a majority vote is required; local option elections for an alcoholic beverage
store, W. VA. CODE ch. 60, art. 5, § 7 (Michie 1966) ; ordinance relating to chargor
for municipal services, W. VA. CoDE ch. 8, art. 13, § 13 (Michie 1969); local
option election concerning Sunday closing law, W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 10, § 28
(Michie 1966); approval of zoning ordinance, W. VA. CODE ch. 8 art. 8 § 24
(Michie 1969); definition of limits of a sanitary district for sewage disposal,
W. VA. CoDE ch. 16, art. 12, § I (Michie 1966); creation of independent free
school districts, W. VA. CoNsr. art. XII, 21A, § 14 (Michie 1966); optional stock
tion districts, W. VA. CODE ch. 19, art. 21A, § 14 (Michie 1966); optional stock
law, W. VA. CODE ch. 19, art. 19, § 3 (Michie 1966). Does the requirement of
extraordinary majority for revenue referendums and only simple majority for
other referendums constitute a discriminatory "classification" in the equal
protection sense? Though this might be argued, additional problems are presented. Initially, there might be an additional obstacle as to whether the appellants in Lance would have standing to raise the issue. Are they deprived
of a benefit? Secondly, the West Virginia controversy might be distinguished from
Hunter v. Erickson on grounds that the amendment to the city charter itself
contained the classification, that is, the classification of types of ordinances.
The classification with reference to the West Virginia provisions exists only
when considered in relation to other referendum elections; the classification is
external to the provisions in question. But is this distinction significant when
considering a denial of fourteenth amendment rights?
SHunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
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his convictions. But, similarly, in the "one man, one vote" decisions,
one might have cast a vote of greater weight by abandoning his place
of residence. Surely one's convictions are entitled to at least equal
weight to that accorded his place of residence in considering the
extent of his constitutional protections. The Supreme Court has
indicated that a distinction based on political convictions" or one
that merely disadvantages those seeking the benefit of specific legislation 6 constitutes grounds for a classification within the prohibitions of the equal protection clause. A group with similar convictions on a referendum issue can also be reasonably considered
protected from unreasonable "classification" within the meaning of
the equal protection clause.
Although the states have considerable latitude in prescribing
the details surrounding the exercise of the right of suffrage, 7 and
"mere classification... does not of itself deprive a group of equal
protection,"88 classifications must be reasonable,89 as opposed to
arbitrary or invidious. 0 The Supreme Court has indicated with
reference to voting that "where fundamental rights and liberties are
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which
might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."'' The reapportionment and voter exclusion decisions not only 'illustrate the Court's attitude toward the weight
that must be accorded an individual's vote, but also imposes upon
the state the burden of justifying any restraint impairing voting
rights.8 2
'See Burns v. Richardson, 884 U.S. 78, 88 (1966). This case concerned the

Hawaii apportionment system which created multi-member senate districts. See
also Carrington v. Rash, 880, U.S. 89, 94 (1965).
"Hunter v. Erickson, 898 U.S. 885 (1969).
SLassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 860 U.S. 45, 50 (1959); See also
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
'Carrington v. Rash, 880 U.S. 89, 92 (1965); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 848 U.S. 483 (1955).
'See e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1965).
'Avery v. Midland County, 890 U.S. 474, 484 (1968). "The Equal Protection Clause does not, of course, require that the State never distinguish between citizens, but only that the distinctions that are made not be artitrary or
invidious."
'Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 883 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
2See e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 895 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 895 U.S. 701 (1969). Normally the burden is upon he
who assails the classification to show that it is not rational, Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 869 (1927), but when the basic "assumption that the institutions
of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all the people" is
challenged, the presumption of constitutionality no longer exists. Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 895, U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
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In determining the reasonableness of a classification a court
"must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting and the interests of
those who are disadvantaged by the classification."' 3 There appears
to be little rational justification for a classification that restricts
the integrity of the vote, the essence of a democratic system, by giving dominant weight to the opinions of those who express themselves on a given side of an issue. The circumstances that gave rise
to the extraordinary majority requirements no longer exist.04 The
interest of those disadvantaged by the classification goes to the very
essence of representative democracy because voting rights are the
"preservative of all rights." 95 "To the extent that a citizen's right
to vote is debased he is that much less a citizen." 06
Moreover, the interests which the state appears to be protecting
are not legitimate objectives: if it is not a mere arbitrary classification (which is prohibited) ,17
seemingly its only purpose would be to
enhance the legislative power of a specific economic or social minority.98 And voting classifications on grounds of distinct economic
or social interests have been rejected as not serving a legitimate state
interest.99 "[T]o preserve certain rights in a minority group ..."
at the expense of political equality clearly denies fourteenth amendment rights.100 Though the appellees suggested that basic issues of

'William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
'The constitutional provision relating to bonded indebtedness was incorporated into the new constitution of 1872, a time during which there was great
concern (approaching complete distrust) with the electoral processes, relating
both to the overriding influence of the masses and to the wisdom of legislative
bodies. The provisions relating to the tax levy were products of the depression,
a time when the lack of money necessitated the limitation of local taxing power.
'Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
"Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964).
'Note 90, supra.
'In response one might contend that there is no "specific" minority since in
a subsequent election a member of the disadvantaged group might become a
member of the advantaged class by merely voting in the negative. But this argument is weakened by an anology to the reapportionment cases. Before the reapportionment decisions, one had merely to move to a district of lesser population to
become a member of the advantaged class in a subsequent election; yet this was
no reason for not finding a denial of fourteenth amendment rights.
'See e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 533 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969); See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80
(1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 692 (1964).
"'State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Bd., 78 N.M. 682, 690, 437 P. 2d

143, 151 (1968).
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sweeping importance. . . such as fiscal matters 10 1 are an adequate
state interest to justify extraordinary majority requirements, fiscal
interests have been rejected as a justification for the denial of a
fundamental constitutional right.1 2 The only legitimate state interest that could be suggested as a rationalization for the maintenance
of the extraordinary majority vote requirements is that of stability.
One might contend that the state must insulate the legislative will
from the public whim since referendum voting may lead to a
dramatic change if the affirmative side is successful but only to the
maintenance of the status quo if the negative side carries. It may
be asserted that this state interest in stability constitutes the basic
ground for distinguishing a referendum election, in which the people determine policy directly, from the election of a representative,
which affects policy only indirectly. However, voting rights are considered fundamental, 10 and this state interest in stability is not
sufficient to justify their impairment. The state bears a particularly
heavy burden to demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify
any infringement on voting rights,-0 regardless of the extent of the
impairment. 10 5 No such compelling interest has been demonstrated.
In fact, the Supreme Court firmly declared "that the interest of
the State, when it comes to voting is limited to the power to fix
qualifications."'0 6 And one's convictions on an issue are just as
irrelevant and capricious as a measure of one's voting qualifications

0

'Appellees' Motion to Dismiss, Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E. 2d 785 (W.
Va. 1969).
"nShapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-31 (1969).
"'Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). The right to vote is
described as "one of the basic civil rights of man," which demands a compelling state interest to justify any infringement. Id.
"'See e.g., Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 n. 14 (1969);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 96 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Mr. Justice
Harlan succinctly explained this doctrine in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
658-61 (1969). A "classification is subject to the 'compelling interest' test if the
result of the classification may be to affect a fundamental right, regardless of
the basis of the classification." Id. at 660. He then noted the doctrine's application in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, Carrington v. Rash, supra, Harper v. Virginia
Bd of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and Williams v. Rhodes 393 U.S. 23 (1968),
all voting cases. In Harper, v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, supra at 370, the test
was phrased "closely scrutinized," and in Reynolds v. Sims, supra at 561-62, the
test was phrased "carefully and meticulously scrutinized."
""'The degree of discrimination is irrelevant." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
'Id. The right to vote is too fundamental to be burdened by any restrictions
that have no relation to voting qualifications. Id. at 670.
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as are homesite, 0 T and wealth. 08 The "political views of a particular
group" are irrelevant to voter qualifications, 109 and, as such, no
state interest can be shown to impair voting rights on this basis.
The state constitutional and statutory provisions at issue have
established a discriminatory classification based upon the manner
in which a person might express himself by his vote. This is constitutionally prohibited: "'The exercise of [voting] rights so vital to
the maintenance of democratic institutions'. . . cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the ... views of a particular
group .. . ."11 Moreover, the type of election is irrelevant since "the
State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making
it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute
any person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than
another of comparable size.""., Thus, a state constitutional provis.
ion which sets up an unreasonable classification, discriminating
against an individual because of the way he might vote in a referendum election, (that is, on the basis of his convictions) constitutes
a denial of fourteenth amendment rights.
IV. Other Arguments
One court recently declared that a state constitutional requirement of two-thirds assent to incur indebtedness by any state subdivision abridges the privileges and immunities guaranteed to the
citizens of the subdivision by the fourteenth amendment." 12 Current Supreme Court interpretation does not extend to this applica-

'"Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). "States can within limits specify the
qualification of voters in both state and federal elections . . . [but] there is no
indication in the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a permissible
basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the State." Id. at 379-80.
"'Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). "MWlealth
or fee paying has... no relation to voting qualification."
u'Carringtora v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). This case involved the exclusion of military personnel from the franchise because of a fear of how they
might vote.
=Id.
""Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969).
"'Bogert v. Kinzer, Civil No. 27864 (6th Dist. Idaho 1969). This case is
now on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. The court here considered the
weighting and resulting debasement of votes, cited two geographical discrimination cases, and argued analogously from a state constitutional provision
requiring non-discriminatory taxation as grounds for the decision. The court
did not consider the validity of the provision permitting only property taxpayers to vote in such elections which is clearly unconstitutional under Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
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tion of the privileges and immunities clause. "1 3 The federal rights
guarantee of the clause "includes those rights and privileges which,
under the laws and Constitution of the United States, are incident to
citizenship of the United States, but does not include rights pertaining to state citizenship and derived solely from the relationship
of the citizen and his state established by state law."114 The right
to vote in an election of state officials (let alone the right to vote on
an issue in an election conducted by a subdivision of the state and
have it computed equally with the votes of others) has never been
accorded the status of a right or privilege of national citizenship
within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause.1 5 Since
the interpretation of the clause has not been construed so as to include voting as a privilege of citizenship of the United States,'" 0 the
right to have a vote accorded equality of weight in a state-wide or
state subdivision election hardly falls within the protections of the
clause. However, it is conceivable in light of the fundamental nature of the vote in relation to representative government and the
democratic process as a whole, that the protection of the clause
might be extended to local voting in years to come.-' 7
It has been argued that standards for judicial regulation can
be found in the guaranty clause." s Arthur Bonfield has explored
the application and implications of the clause as a device to pro-

'The fourteenth amendment provides that: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; . . ." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
"Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1. 6-7 (1944). The Court held that the
privileges and immuities amendment, among other constitutional provisions,
does not guarantee the right to a citizen to become a candidate for state office in
that the clause does not protect rights derived from state law and concerning
only the individual-to-state relationship. See also Madden V. Kentucky, 309 U.S.
83 (1940); Slaughter-House Cases 16 U.S. (Wall.) 36 (1872).
"See Pirtle v. Brown, 118 F. 2d 218 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
621 (1942); Hall v. Geals, 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1968); Harper v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 240 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Va. 1964), retd, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ;
Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S.E. 2d 221 (1949), appeal denied, 339 U.S.
946 S1950); Allen v. Merrell, 7 Utah 2d 32, 305 P.2d 490 (1956).
eSee Minor v. Happersett, 21 U.S. (Wall.) 162, 170-78 (1874). The Court
noted that if suffrage were one of the areas sought to be protected by the privileges and immunities clause, there would have been no need for the fifteenth
amendment. See also Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 277, 283 (1938).
"'Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), in which Mr.
Justice Douglas indicated that the right to vote in state elections is implicit in
the first amendment.
"'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .. " U.S. CNsT.art. IV, § 4.
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mote a fuller realization of American ideals." 9 But the clause has
never been successfully applied to representation cases, 120 and its
relevance to the West Virginia constitutional and statutory provisions under question present even greater difficulties. Initially,
"The State" would have to be interpreted as the "body of citizens;"
otherwise the guarantee would be applied on behalf of the state as
against the state. In addition, a very broad intrepretation of the
phrase "Republican form of Government" would be required
to
2
attach relevance to voting on an issue .'

Daniel F. Hedges

Constitutional Law-Lance v. Board of Education-The

Dissenting Opinion
I The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Haymond's vigorous dissent to the majority's decision
was two-fold: it denied the authority of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals to declare a provision of the West Virginia constitution unconstitutional, and it denied that the circumstances in
Lance were such as to warrant an extension of the "one person, one
vote" principle.
In support of its first contention, the minority argued initially
that the court was bound by oath to support the West Virginia constitution; secondly that only the sovereign people of West Virginia
could ratify, amend and repeal their state constitution; and thirdly that the court's assertion of authority was without precedent.
The dissent's first argument dismissed the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution.' Article IV, section five of the
West Virginia constitution sets forth the oath by which all public
... Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitution: Guarantee of a
Republican Government, 50 CALiF. L. REV. 245 (1962); Bonfield, The Guaranty
Clause of Article IV, Section 4; A Study of Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN.
L. REv. 513 (1962).
'See e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Irish v. Democratic Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Gir. 1968):
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. 282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
"ZtThis guaranty clause argument was presented by the appellees. Brief for
Appellees at 31, Lance v. Board of Educ., 170 S.E.F d 783 (W. Va. 1969).
'US. CONsr. art. VI.
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